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[So F. No. 20531. In Bank. Mar. 1, 1962.] 
RUSSELL S. HARRIS, as Executor, etc., Plaintiff and Re-
spondent, v. ROLLAND H. HARRIS et al., Defendants 
and Appellants. 
[1] Husband and Wife-Management of Community Property-
Limitations on Power of Disposition.-Under Civ. Code, § 172, 
declaring that the husband cannot make a gift of the com-
munity personal property without the wife's consent, gifts 
made without the wife's consent are not void, but are void-
able at her instance. 
[2] Id.-Management of Community Property-Actions to Avoid 
Transfers.-If a wife acts during the continuance of the 
community to avoid her husband's gift of community personal 
property without her consent, the whole gift will be avoided. 
If she acts after the community has been dissolved, the gift 
will be avoided to the extent of her half interest in the com-
munity property transferred. 
[3] Id.-Mana.gement of Community Property-Wife's Interest.-
In addition to the wife's rights in community property under 
Civ. Code, § 161a, defining the respective interests of each 
spouse during continuance of the marriage relation as "present, 
existing and equal" under the management and control of the 
husband, a wife has absolute power of testamentary disposition 
over half of such property (Prob. Code, § 201), and Civ. Code, 
§ 172, safeguards these rights by precluding dissipation of her 
estate without her permission. 
[4] Abatement-Death of Party-Survival of Actions.-A cause 
of action for the violation of a property right survives the 
death of the owner of the right. (Civ. Code, § 954.) 
[5] Husband and Wife-Management of Community Property-
Actions to Avoid Transfers.-The present interest of a wife in 
community property and her right to dispose of one-half by 
will being property rights that are invaded by a husband's 
gift without her consent, the right to set aside such gifts 
[1] Power of either spouse, without consent of other, to make 
gift of community property or funds to third party, note, 17 
A.L.R.2d 1118. See also Cal.Jur.2d, Community Property, § 72. 
[4] See Cal.Jur.2d, Abatement and Revival, § 60; Am.Jur., 
Abatement and Revival, § 80. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Husband and Wife, § 103(5); [2,5,6] 
Husband and Wife, § 108; [3J Husband and Wife, § 99; [4J Abate-
ment, § 42; [7-9] Insane Persons, § 39. 
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survives the wife's death and may be exercised by her per-
sonal representative. 
[6] Id.-Management of Community Property-Actions to Avoid 
Transfers.-An executor of the estate of n deceased incom-
petent whose husband gave defendant certain stock without 
her consent during her incompetency was entitled to recover 
half of the property transferred where consent was not given 
by the guardian. 
[7] Insane Persons - Guardianship - Allowance of Gifts. - Al-
though neither the general guardian nor a court has the power 
to dispose of the ward's property by way of gift, such rigid 
principle has its exception where allowances from the surplus 
income of the estate of an incompetent person are sought as 
donations for charitable and religious purposes and with the 
object of carrying out the presumed wishes of such person. 
[8] Icl.-Guardianship-Allowances to Next of Kin.-Allowances 
from the estate of an incompetent person for the support of 
next of kin may be approved on a showing that the incom-
petent would have made them as suggested. (Prob. Code, 
§ 1558.) 
[9] Id.-Guardianship-Allowance of Gifts.-A guardian of an in-
competent person has no authority to make gifts from the in-
competent's estate without prior court permission. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Ala-
meda County. Monroe Friedman, Judge. Affirmed. 
Action by executor of estate to recover community property 
transferred by decedent's deceased husband while decedent 
was an adjudged incompetent. Judgment for plaintiff affirmed. 
Robert A. Kaiser, Jeremiah F. O'Neill, Jr., and John E. 
Nolan for Defendants and Appellants. 
Clarence De Lancey, Raymond C. Gericke and Myron A. 
Martin for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-Defendants appeal from a judgment for 
plaintiff, executor of the estate of Susie Almeda Harris, in 
an action to recover community property transferred by her 
deceased husband without valuable consideration in violation 
of section 172 of the Civil Code. 
Plaintiff is th.e son of Marshall C. Harris and Susie Almeda 
Harris and the father of defendant Rolland H. Harris. Mar-
shall and Susie Harris were married in 1894. In 1945 Susie 
[9] See Cal.Jur.2d, Insane and Incompetent Persons, § 74. 
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Harris made a will leaving all her property to Marshall Harris 
if he was living six months after her death. If he was not 
then living her property was to go to plaintiff. In 1948 Susie 
Harris was adjudged an incompetent, and Marshall Harris 
was appointed her guardian. He relinquished the guardian-
ship and was replaced by plaintiff on March 28, 1957. Susie 
Harris died on September 26, 1957. Marshall Harris died on 
December 10, 1957. 
Between 1950 and March 28, 1957, Marshall Harris made 
gifts of community property totalling $29,543.76 to defend-
ants. After March 28, 1957, he gave defendants certain 
stock, to which the trial court assigned no value, and other 
assets valued at $26,665.89. The finding of the trial court that 
Susie Harris was incapable of giving her consent to any of 
these gifts is amply supported by the record. 
Section 172 of the Civil Code provides:" ... [T]he husband 
has the management and control of the community per.sonal 
property, with like absolute power of disposition, other than 
testamentary, as he has of his separate estate; provided, how-
ever, that he cannot make a gift of such community personal 
property, or dispose of the same without a valuable considera-
tion ... without the written consent of the wife. " [ 1] Gifts 
made without the consent of the wife are not void, but are 
voidable at the instance of the wife. (Trimble v. Trimble, 
219 Cal. 340, 344 [26 P.2d 477] ; Spreckels v. Spreckels, 172 
Cal. 775, 784 [158 P. 537].) [2] If the wife acts to avoid 
the gift during the continuance of the community, the 
whole gift will be avoided. (Britton v. Hammell, 4 Cal.2d 
690,692 [52 P.2d 221].) If she acts after the community has 
been dissolved, the gift will be avoided to the extent of her 
one-half interest in the community property transferred. 
(Trimble v. Trimble, supra, p. 347.) 
Defendant contends that plaintiff cannot maintain this 
action on the ground that the right to avoid gifts made in 
violation of section 172 is a right personal to the wife that 
does not survive her death and cannot be exercised by her 
executor. 
Section 161a of the Civil Code defines the interests of hus-
band and wife in community property: "The respective inter-
ests of the husband and wife in community property during 
continuance of the marriage relation are present, existing and 
equal interests under the management and control of the hus-
band as is provided in sections 172 and 172a of the Civil Code. 
This section shall be construed as defining the respective 
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interests and rights of husband and wife in the commuuity 
property." Section 161a applies to all property involved in 
this case, for it was enacted in 1927 and the trial eourt found 
that the property was all acquired by the cOlllmunity after 
1927. [3] In addition to her rights under section 161a, 
a wife has absolute power of testamentary disposition over 
one-half of such property. (Prob. Code, § 201.) Section 172 
safeguards these rights by precluding dissipation of her 
estate without her permission. Unlike the present case, Estate 
of Blair, 42 Ca1.2d 728, 730-731 [269 P.2d 612], and Estate 
of Bunn, 33 Ca1.2d 897, 900 [206 P.2d 635], on which defend-
ants rely, did not involve the invasion of present and existing 
property rights or the exercise of a statutory remedy for 
such invasion. 
[ 4 ] A cause of action for the violation of a property right 
survives the death of the owner of the right. (Civ. Code, 
§ 954.) The present interest of a wife in community property 
and her right to dispose of one-half by will are property 
rights that are invaded by a husband's gift without her 
consent.. [5] Thus the right to set aside such gifts survives 
the death of the wife and may be exercised by her personal 
representative_ 
[6] The record establishes that the gifts made by Marshall 
Harris after March 28, 1957, were made without the consent 
of Susie Harris. The trial court found that she was incapable 
of giving such consent. Nor was it given by plaintiff while he 
was her guardian. It could not be given after her death. 
Therefore it is clear that plaintiff should recover one-half of 
the property transferred after March 28, 1957. 
The gifts made between 1950 and March 28, 1957, present 
a more difficult question. During this period Marshall Harris 
was his wife's guardian. If he had power as her guardian 
to give the consent required by section 172 and validly gave 
such consent plaintiff cannot set those gifts aside. 
[7] Although" 'neither the general guardian nor a 
court has the power to dispose of the ward's property by 
way of gift' [citation], such rigid principle has its exception 
""here allowances from the surplus income of the cstate are 
sought as 'donations for charitable and religious purposes' 
and with the object of 'carrying out the presumed wishes of' 
the incompe [te] nt person [citations]." (Guardianship of Hall, 
31 Ca1.2d 157, 168 [187 P.2d 396].) [8] Allowances for 
the support of next of kin may also be approved upon a 
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suggested. (Prob. Code, § 1558; Guardianship of Hall, supra; 
Gual'dianship of Hudelsoll, 18 Ca1.2d 401, 403-406 [115 P.2d 
805] ; In re Gual'dianship of Brice, 233 Iowa 183, 186-187 
[8 N.W.2d 576J; In re Johnson, 111 N.J.Eq. 268, 270 [162 
A. 96] ; Matter of Flagler, 248 N.Y. 415, 418-419 [162 N.E. 
471, 59 A.L.R. 649J.) [9] A guardian has no authority, 
however, to makc such gifts without prior court permission. 
(Guardianship of Hall, supra.) Defendants do not claim that 
Marshall Harris secured such permission before, or after, 
making the contested gifts. Nor have they presented evidence 
tending to establish that Susie Harris would have approved 
the gifts had she been competent. The pre-March 28, 1957, 
gifts, as well as those made after that date, ,vere therefore 
made without the consent of Susie Harris as required by 
Civil Code section 172. The trial court correctly determined 
that plaintiff should recover one-half of all gifts of community 
property made by Marshall Harris to defendants between 
1950 and his death in 1957. 
The judgment is affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Peters, J., White, J., and Dooling, J., con-
curred. 
McCOMB, J.-I dissent. I would reverse the judgment for 
the reasons expressed by Mr. Justice Shoemaker in the opinion 
prepared by him for the District Court of Appeal in Harris 
v. Harris (Cal.App.), 16 Cal.Rptr. 561, which, so far as neces-
sary for my purposes, reads: 
[]. The defendants' first contention on appeal is that the 
plaintiff Russell S. Harris, suing as executor of the estate 
of Susie Almeda Harris, does not have standing to sue to 
recover one-half of the community property transferred to 
defendants by Marshall C. Harris. We agree with this con-
tention. 
Civil Code, section 172, states (prior to the 1959 amend-
ments), so far as is pertinent: "The husband has the man-
agement and control of the community personal property, 
with like absolute power of disposition, other than testa-
mentary, as he has of his separate estate; provided, however, 
that he cannot make a gift of such community personal prop-
erty, or dispose of the same without a valuable consideration, 
or sell, convey, ?r encumber the furniture, furnishings, or 
-Brackets together, in this manner [J, are used to indicate deletions 
. from the opinion of the District Court of Appeal. 
) 
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fittings of the home, or the clothing or wearing apparel of 
the wife or minor children that is community, without the 
written consent of the wife." 
A review of the California decisions involving Civil Code, 
section 172, indicates that the husband's transfer of personal 
community property, without valuable consideration or with-
out the wife's consent, immediately vests the property in the 
donee subject to avoidance by the wife upon proof of facts 
necessary to that end. (Spreckels v. Spreckels (1916) 172 
Cal. 775, 784 [158 P. 537] ; Trimble v. Trimble (1933) 219 
Cal. 340, 344 [26 P.2d 477] ; Mayr v. Arana (1955) 133 Cal. 
App.2d 471, 477 [284 P.2d 21].) The wife can set aside the 
transfer of the personal property by the husband, which is 
without valuable consideration or her consent, in its entirety 
during the lifetime of her husband. (Britton v. Hammell 
(1935) 4 Ca1.2d 690 [52 P.2d 221].) After his death, the 
widow may set aside one-half of the unauthorized transfers 
(Trimble v. Trimble, supra), or recover one-half of the value 
from her husband's estate. (Fields v. Michael (1949) 91 Cal. 
App.2d 443, 448 [205 P.2d 402].) 
Weare of the opinion that the right to so avoid a transfer 
of community personal property made by the husband in 
violation of the statute is, however, personal to the wife, in-
tended so~ely for her benefit and her protection (Italian 
American Bank v. Canepa (1921) 52 Cal.App. 619, 621 [199 
P. 55] ; Pomper v. Behnke (1929) 97 Cal.App. 628, 638 [276 
P. 122]; Blethen v. Pacific M1d. Life Ins. Co. (1926) 198 
Cal. 91, 100 [243 P. 431]; Spreckels v. Spreckels, supra; 
Schindler v. Schindler (1954) 126 Cal.App.2d 597, 603 [2i2 
P.2d 566]), although not so personal that a guardian of an 
incompetent wife during her lifetime would 110t have the right 
to maintain an action on her behalf (Scott v. Au.stin (1922) 
57 Cal.App. 553 [207 P. 710]) ; the right being purely pet'-
sonal to the wife, it must follow that if she, or her guardian 
in case of incompetency, fails to act during her lifetime to 
invalidate a gift of community personal property, the gift 
becomes valid in its entirety. (United States v. Stewart (1959) 
270 F.2d 894, '900 [applying California law] ; Mayr v. Arana, 
supra; Italian American Bank v. Canepa, supra.) A personal 
right, which is not assignable, does not survive the death of 
the person entitled to it even if the wife is incompetent and 
the guardian has not acted on her behalf during her life. 
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Hansen v. Bear Film 00., Inc. (1946) 28 Cal.2d 154 [168 
P.2d 946], and Pearl v. Pwrl (1918) 177 Cal. 303 [177 
P. 845], cited in respondent's reply brief, concern cases 
wherein transfers of property were made to parties to be 
held in trust for the transferor. However, the court in the case 
before us did not find that the defendants held the property 
in trust and the citations are inapplicable. 
Stafford v. Mat·tinoni (1923) 192 Cal. 724 [221 P. 919], 
and Makeig v. United Security Bank ~ Trust 00. (1931) 
112 Cal.App. 138 (296 P. 673], also cited in respondent's 
reply brief, concern actions for an accounting of community 
property which was in the deceased's possession at death, and 
do not present the same fact situations as found in this case. 
Likewise, Probate Code, section 201, concerning succession of 
community property after death, does not affect the husband's 
management and control during the lifetime of the parties. 
(Trimble v. Trimble, supra, at pp. 340, 345, 346.) [] 
Schauer, J., concurred. 
Appellants' petition for a rehearing was denied March 28, 
1962. Schauer, J., and McComb, J., were of the opinion that 
the petition should be granted. 
